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Abstract 
We argue that there exists an indirect link between globalization and the knowledge economy 
of African countries in which globalization influences ‘peace and stability’ and peace and 
stability affects governance, and through governance the knowledge economy. We model the 
link as a three-stage process in four testable hypotheses, which permits an empirical analysis 
without sacrificing economic relevance for statistical significance. The results indicate that 
the impacts on governance of peace and stability from globalization defined as trade are 
stronger than those of peace and stability resulting from globalization taken to be foreign 
direct investment. We conclude that foreign direct investment is not a powerful mechanism 
for stimulating and sustaining the African knowledge. However, since the effects of 
globalization on peace and stability can influence governance both positively and negatively, 
we also conclude that the prospect for the knowledge economy in African countries may be 
realistic and attainable, as long as these countries continue to engage in the kind of 
globalization that enhances peace and stability.  
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1. Introduction  
Andrés, Asongu and Amavilah’s (2015) analysis of the impact of formal institutions through 
the enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPRs) on the knowledge economy (henceforth 
KE) of 22 Middle East and North African (MENA) and Sub-Sahara African (SSA) countries 
concluded that IPRs were necessary, but inadequate, determinants of the KE. We claim that 
‘peace and stability’ resulting from globalization may affect the KE through governance.1 
The claim permits us to close an existing gap in the understanding of KE in Africa. 
 We put forward four hypotheses, and apply a three-stage regression technique to 
estimate and test those hypotheses. In the first stage we associate peace and stability with 
trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) as measures of globalization (openness). In the 
second stage, peace and stability influences three indicators of governance: general 
governance (GG), economic governance (EG), and institutional governance (IG). Finally, we 
relate governance to measures of KE: Education (Educatex), information and communication 
technologies (ICTex), innovation (Innovex), and economic incentives (Creditex). Analysis 
finds positive and negative correlations among indicators of peace and stability and those of 
KE via governance, suggesting that for this group of countries trade openness is a more 
effective mechanism for innovation than FDI openness.  
 In the light of the above, the purpose of this paper is to assess the linkages between 
and among globalization, peace and stability, governance, and the knowledge economy. The 
corresponding research question is: What is the relationship between globalization and 
stability, and how does such a relationship affect governance and thereby influence KE in 
African countries? The rationale and motivation for asking and pursuing the research 
question is that there is a clear gap in the current literature on a subject that is critical to 
technological progress and social change in African countries. For example, increasing 
international competition brought about by the pace of globalization raises concerns 
regarding whether or not a KE is possible for African countries. 
                                                          
1We use the terms ‘stability’, ‘peace and stability’, ‘peace and political stability’, and ‘no violence’, 
interchangeably.  In that sense ‘peace and stability’ is a singular noun. Asongu et al. (2016a) have established 
that globalization affects political stability. (ii) From intuition, such stability provides enabling conditions for 
institutional and economic governance.  In essence, the effective delivery of public commodities (or economic 
governance) is more feasible when there is relative political stability and non-violence in a country. Moreover, 
the respect by the State and citizens of institutions that govern interactions between them (or institutional 
governance) is facilitated by peace and stability. (iii) It is also logical to postulate that such peaceful conditions 
for economic and institutional governance facilitate the drive towards knowledge-based-economies, notably, in 
terms of education, good information and communication infrastructure, innovation and economic incentives.  
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 This line of inquiry contributes to the extant literature by articulating interconnections 
between macroeconomic variables and other phenomena which drive KE in Africa. We 
examine the interconnections by considering the four dimensions of the World Bank’s KE 
index, namely: education, innovation, economic incentives and institutional regime and 
information and communication technology (ICT). Such a positioning opens up another angle 
for both policy and research by steering clear of the growing body of KE literature which has 
focused only on one or two dimensions of KE as in Lin (2006), Rooney (2005), Anyanwu 
(2012) broadly; Butcher (2011) on ICT; Ford (2007); Weber (2011), and Wantchekon, 
Klasnja and Novta (2014) on education; Oyelaran-Oyeyinka & Sampath (2007), and Carisle, 
Kunc, Jones, and Tiffin (2013) on innovation; and Cogburn (2003), Asongu and Le  Roux 
(2017), Letiche (2006), Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016ab) on economic incentives and 
institutional regime.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a background to the research, 
including key relationships among globalization, peace and stability, governance, and KE(cf. 
Tchamyou, 2016). Section 3 outlines the methodology: (a) variables and data, (b) the 
theoretical framework, (c) hypotheses, and (c) estimation technique. The empirical results 
and their implications for policy and further research are discussed in Sections 4, while 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Background 
2.1 Globalization, and peace and stability 
Globalization is essential to peace and stability, and hence to governance
2
 (Asongu et al., 
2016a). Bonaglia, Braga de Maceda, and Bussolo (2001) found that globalization as trade 
openness reduces corruption. Lalountas, Manolas, and Vavouras (2011) and Asongu (2014a) 
have confirmed the positive role of globalization in governance in developing nations, 
including African countries, as it relates to mitigating corruption. While the preceding 
references postulate a positive relationship between peace and stability and globalization, 
another strand of literature has asserted a negative correlation between globalization, and 
peace and stability as evident from the conflicts line of research. A good example of line of 
                                                          
2
 It is important to note that governance can be political (political stability/no violence and voice & 
accountability); economic (government effectiveness and regulation quality) and institutional (corruption-
control and rule of law) (see Asongu et al., 2016a). Moreover, within the framework of the study, governance 
exclusively embodies the economic and institutional dimensions of governance because one dimension of 
political governance (i.e. political stability/non violence) is considered as exogenous to economic and 
institutional governance in the first hypothesis. 
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work is Rodrik (1997) who measures conflicts as latent frictions particular to any community 
relative to its institutional capability for managing such frictions. He represents globalization 
with external shocks transmitted through the mechanism of foreign trade, and shows that for 
developing countries both external shocks (globalization) and latent frictions (conflicts) have 
negative effects on economic growth, the former because of the poor quality of institutions 
and the latter because of declining terms of trade.   
 Messer and Cohen (2006) also provide evidence of the correlation between 
globalization and conflicts. They argue that external market forces tend to increase 
fluctuations in, and unpredictability of, crop export prices. Such price fluctuations and 
unpredictability have led to food insecurity and conflicts. In a related area, Olzak (2011) 
observed that economic and cultural globalization are associated with deaths from internal 
armed ethnic conflicts, and that socio-cultural globalization increases ethnic conflicts, but 
reduces non-ethnic conflicts. By implication, globalization stimulates intra-ethnic 
competition for scarce resources, but it also creates a new understanding that diffuses inter-
ethnic frictions. This finding is reasonable; peace and stability is highly correlated with 
measures of democracy. In a study of 28 SSA countries over 1980-2005 years V.C. Jaunky 
(2013) shows that there is a direct correlation between economic growth and democracy in 
the short-run which turns into a bi-directional causation between the two in the long-run (cf. 
Barro, 1996). 
 Since globalization defuses inter-ethnic conflicts by promoting democracy, then one 
can argue that under conditions of peace and stability not all conflicts would affect 
governance and KE negatively. Hence, Rodrik’s observation does not mean the absence of 
conflict, but the existence of the capability to manage conflicts effectively. To this 
interpretation, Tidwell and Lerche (2011) add that globalization and conflicts are complex 
and inter-active, and their marginal (short-run) effects on economic performance are likely 
ambiguous, because not all conflicts are violent, and not all violent conflicts have necessarily 
bad consequences. In the same vein Moahi (2007) has added another insightful perspective. 
He describes a situation in which the spread of globalization and the growth of KE tend to 
unbalance power relations between developed and developing economies. In the absence of 
appropriate IPRs globalization and conflicts harm indigenous knowledge and knowledge 
systems, such that that globalization can lead to economic growth and yet hurt KE if it upsets 
the relationship between governance and peace and stability. There is clearly a link between 
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globalization and conflicts, and so of opposite sign between globalization and peace and 
stability.  
2.2 Governance, conflicts, peace and stability, and globalization 
Neo-liberal economists have tended to over-stress the negative relationship between 
governance and conflicts (cf. Rodrik, 1997). Their logic is that conflicts weaken the quality 
of institutions of governance. Weak institutions are then unable to manage latent frictions of 
the kind Rodrik refers to, which in turn lead to even more severe conflicts.  While such 
arguments are reasonable, they are nonetheless linear in form and static in content for 
ignoring the effects of globalization on peace and stability, and the indirect effects through 
peace and stability of globalization on governance as emphasized next. 
 Globalization affects governance indirectly through peace and stability as well as 
directly. Culturally, globalization spreads new ideas, technologies, tools, attitudes, and social 
networks, and these have direct effects on governance. Also, many countries are sensitive to 
international relations (e.g., trade, remittances, FDI, aid, education, health, international law, 
and diplomacy), which are aspects of globalization. Indeed, Bonaglia, et al. (2001) show 
‘how globalization improves governance’ by asking whether ‘there is an effect of 
globalization on governance’ – the title of their paper. They specify the variables that affect 
institutional change, and assess whether or not such variables reduce corruption 
(cf.Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001).  They found that high-level measures of 
globalization correlate with low-level indicators of corruption, although mineral exports, and 
in some cases trade liberalization, work against governance. 
 
2.3 Globalization, peace and stability, governance, and KE 
Although weak according to Andrés, et al. (2015), the connection between KE and 
governance is obvious. It is also hard to measure due to the lack of specificity with which to 
represent KE. M.H. Khan (2007) observes that liberal economists tend to think of governance 
as “market-enhancing capabilities that reduce transaction costs and enable markets to work 
more efficiently,[whereas for] … heterodox economists governance is the capacities to 
overcome entrenched market failures” (pp. 8-16).  In this case governance is important to 
economic growth for two different reasons. First, economic growth happens when markets 
are efficient, even if output remains unchanged; in another, governance promotes economic 
growth only if it enhances productivity. In examining the historical evidence, Khan(2007) 
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finds a statistically strong effect of governance as market-enhancing capabilities on economic 
growth for a sample of developed and developing countries, but no such effect at all for 
African countries.   
 An example of market-enhancing governance is also evident from Bigsten and 
Durevall’s (2002) study which uses globalization and market integration interchangeably, so 
that global markets imply the ‘law of one price’, and deviations from (exceptions to) that law 
are taken as punishable market offenses. They offer Zimbabwe’s experience as an example of 
a country that has been punished by market forces for violating of ‘the law of one price.’ 
However, it seems that governance as productivity-enhancing is a better model for African 
countries, although it is also the mechanism S. Korea, Malaysia, and China have used with 
stellar, and India and Latin America with mixed, results, which seems to suggest that the 
problem is in the implementation of productivity-enhancing governance – not the model itself 
(see Khan, 2007, p. 21, last paragraph). 
 Fayissa and Nsiah (2010) provide further evidence of the effects of governance on 
economic growth for African countries. The ‘good governance’ goes hand-in-hand with good 
institutions as economic growth drivers, leading to the conclusion that (a) ‘good governance 
has a positive and significant impact on growth, regardless of the proxy used for governance’ 
(p.14), and (b) low-income countries benefit more from good governance than high-income 
countries. Such a conclusion is reasonable in light of the argument by Kaufmann and 
Kraay(2003), Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Labaton (2002),Kaufmann and Kraay (2002), 
Kaufmann and Zoido-Labaton (1999a, 1999b) that good governance leads to economic 
growth, but in the case of ‘state capture’, economic growth does not lead back to good 
institutions or good governance (cf. Khan, 2010). The result is also consistent with Alesina, 
Spolaore, and Wacziarg’s (2000) assertion that performance depends on the balance between 
the ‘economic integration’ effect of trade and the ‘political disintegration’ effect of FDI. 
 Contrary to the preceding argument Quibria (2006) found that for Asian countries 
economic growth has been fastest in countries with low governance indicators. The 
inconsistency may be due to the different measures of governance used. Amavilah (2009b, 
2009c, 2009d) observes that the influence of governance on economic performance depends 
on how governance is measured. For example, using the World Bank’s six world governance 
indicators and the Mo Ibrahim Foundation’s governance indicators for African countries, one 
finds that although governance has a positive effect on economic growth on average, the 
effects of specific measures of governance differ, often in opposite directions. According to 
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the six world indicators of governance, the ‘rule of law’ constrains, but with respect to Mo 
Ibrahim’s indicators, it promotes, economic performance. Whichever way, there is a 
relationship between governance and economic performance activity (cf. Strulik and 
Prskawetz, 2013). 
 Using the KOF Index of Globalization, Dreher (2003, 2006) looked at 123 countries 
over the 1970-2000 period and determined that globalization led to economic growth, even as 
it did not reduce poverty and income inequality in all countries.
3
 Political globalization had 
no major effect, information flows (ICTs) had minimal effects, and economic globalization 
had strong effects, but such effects were conditional on the nature of global relations between 
developed and developing countries.  Amavilah (2009d) utilized Dreher’s data to compare 
the effects of globalization, governance, and physical and human capital on the economic 
performance of Sub-Saharan African countries, and discovered that economic performance 
varied with measures of globalization and governance. However, it is social globalization 
rather than economic globalization that is most beneficial to growth. On average the quality 
of institutions is important to economic performance, but measures of institutional quality 
have different effects on performance. 
 Last, but not least, Goklany (2002) has argued that globalization improved the well-
being of nations because it reduced hunger, infant mortality, and child labor, as well as 
increased life-expectancy. Tsai (2007) adds that while average and political globalization 
have improved the well-being of nations, social and economic globalization have had either 
negative or positive effects. Working with the Human Development Index (HDI) as a 
measure of national well-being Amavilah (2009b, 2009c) uncovered that social globalization 
is important to the well-being of 93 nations worldwide, but not nearly as much as material 
well-being (real GDP per capita). Thus, we claim that only certain kinds of globalization 
affect peace and stability in ways conducive to governance, and hence KE. 
3. Methodology: Variables, data and methods 
Below we consider a number of measurement issues, beginning with key variables and data. 
 
                                                          
3
The KOF data is available at http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/. As of 2015 KOF Index has grown to 
207 countries and territories. 
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3.1 Variables and data  
We investigate a panel of 53 African countries (excluding South Sudan) with data from 
African Development Indicators of the World Bank for the period 1996-2010. We limit the 
scope of the investigation to that period because the data for the indicators of peace and 
political stability is only available from 1996. The year 2010 is based on data availability at 
the time of the study. The focus on Africa is because there is a gap in the current literature 
about the KE of African countries. 
Most of the data is from World Governance Indicators and World Development Indicators of 
the World Bank. For example, the governance indicators are from World Governance 
Indicators whereas other macroeconomic indicators are from World Development Indicators 
(see Table 1). The KE variables contain the four dimensions of the World Bank’s KE index, 
namely: education, innovation, economic incentives and institutional regime and ICT. The 
political stability indicator is only available from World Governance Indicators, and that too 
has contributed to the scope of the study. 
Table1characterizes key variables, data, and data sources. Additional variable definitions and 
clarifications  are in table footnotes.
Among the key variables are indicators of KE (Panel A), 
governance (Panel B), globalization (Panel C), and peace and stability (Panel D), as well as 
control variables (Panel E). Preliminary descriptive statistics reveal very high coefficients of 
correlation, some of them running as high as |-0.945| like that between Innovex and Creditex, 
for instance.
4
 The high correlations indicate a strong presence of heteroscedasticity, along 
with multicollinearity, which is in line with previous literature which documented that 
constituent elements of the Knowledge Economy Index (KEI) are correlated with one 
another. Hence, we first apply the principal component analysis (PCA) to reduce a large set 
of highly correlated variables into a smaller set of uncorrelated principal components (PCs) 
that retain necessary and sufficient information as was in the initial dataset to KE and 
governance indicators (cf. Asongu, 2013a, 2013b, 2015; Andrés et al, 2015). We use the 
Kaiser (1974) and Jolliffe (2002) criterion for retaining the PCs with eigenvalues greater than 
the mean or one, because they denote eigenvectors which contain a significant proportion of 
the initial information. 
                                                          
4
 Such data and other auxiliary material are available upon request. 
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3.2 Knowledge economy indicators  
Table 2below displays the first PCs for which eigenvalues are greater than one: education 
(Educatex), information and communication technology (ICTex), innovation (Innovex), and 
economic incentives (Creditex).  
3.3 Governance indicators  
We limit the concept of governance to economic and institutional dimensions only, because 
the political aspect of governance (peace and stability) is to be used in the first-phase of the 
estimation process. To begin with, we obtain a composite indicator of general governance 
(GG), and then decompose it into its economic (government effectiveness and regulation 
quality) and institutional (corruption-control and rule of law) dimensions. Economic  
Table 1: Definition of variables 
    
Variables Signs Variable definitions Sources 
 
Panel A: Knowledge Economy   
 
Panel A1: Education 
    
Primary School Enrolment  PSE School enrolment, primary (% of gross) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Secondary School Enrolment  SSE School enrolment, secondary (% of gross) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Tertiary School Enrolment  TSE School enrolment, tertiary (% of gross) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Education in KE Educatex First PC of PSE, SSE & TSE PCA 
    
Panel A2: Information & Infrastructure  
    
Internet  Users  Internet Internet users (per 100 people)  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Mobile Cellular Subscriptions  Mobile Mobile subscriptions (per 100 people) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Telephone lines Tel Telephone lines (per 100 people) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Information & Communication 
Technology (ICT) in KE 
ICTex First PC of Internet, Mobile & Tel PCA 
    
Panel A3: Economic Incentives   
    
Financial Activity (Credit) Pcrbof Private domestic credit from banks and 
other financial institutions  
World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Interest Rate Spreads IRS Lending rate minus deposit rate (%) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Economic Incentives in KE Creditex First PC of Pcrbof and IRS PCA 
    
Panel A4: Innovation  
    
Scientific & Technical Publications  STJA  Number of Scientific & Technical Journal 
Articles  
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Trademark Applications  Trademark  Total Trademark Applications World Bank (WDI) 
    
Patent Applications  Patent Total Residents + Nonresident Patent 
Applications  
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Innovation in KE Innovex First PC of STJA, Trademarks and Patents  PCA 
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Panel B: Governance  
    
Panel B1: Economic Governance  
    
 
Government Effectiveness 
 
GE 
Government effectiveness (estimate): 
measures the quality of public services, the 
quality and degree of independence from 
political pressures of the civil service, the 
quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of 
governments’ commitments to such 
policies.  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
    
Regulation Quality  RQ Regulation quality (estimate): measured as 
the ability of the government to formulate 
and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote 
private sector development.  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
    
Economic Governance  EG First Principal Component of Government 
Effectiveness and Regulation Quality. The 
capacity of government to formulate & 
implement policies, and to deliver 
services.  
              PCA 
    
    
Panel B2: Institutional Governance  
    
Rule of Law RL Rule of law (estimate): captures 
perceptions of the extent to which agents 
have confidence in and abide by the rules 
of society and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, the courts, as well as the likelihood 
of crime and violence.  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
    
Corruption Control CC Control of corruption (estimate): captures 
perceptions of the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state 
by elites and private interests.  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
    
Institutional Governance IG First Principal Component of Rule of Law 
and Corruption-Control. The respect for 
citizens and the state of institutions  
that govern the interactions among them 
PCA 
    
    
Panel B3: General Governance  
    
General Governance   GG First principal component of Political 
Stability, Voice & Accountability, 
Government Effectiveness, Regulation 
Quality, Rule of Law and Corruption-
Control.  
PCA 
    
Panel C: Globalization  
Trade Openness  Trade Exports plus Imports of Commodities (% 
of GDP) 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Financial Openness  FDI Gross Foreign Direct Investment (% of 
GDP) 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Globalization  Global Trade Openness + Financial Openness  Employed 
interactively during 
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regressions  
    
Panel D: Political Stability/No Violence (Dependent variable) 
    
Political Stability  PolSta Political stability/no violence (estimate): 
measured as the perceptions of the 
likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by 
unconstitutional and violent means, 
including domestic violence and terrorism.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Panel E: Control Variables  
    
Inflation  Infl Consumer Price Index (Annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Government Expenditure  Gov. Exp. Government’s Final Consumption 
Expenditure (% of GDP) 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Economic Prosperity  GDPg Gross Domestic Product (Annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
ICT Service Exports  ICTexp ICT Service Exports (% of service exports, 
BoP) 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Liquid Liabilities  Fdgdp Financial System Deposits (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Financial System Efficiency  FcFd Financial System Credit on Financial 
System Deposits  
World Bank (WDI) 
    
    
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators. WGI: World Governance Indicators.GDP: Gross Domestic Product. PC: 
Principal Component. PCA: Principal Component Analysis. Educatexis the first principal component of primary, secondary 
and tertiary school enrolments. ICTex: first principal component of mobile, telephone and internet subscriptions. Creditex: 
First PC of Private domestic credit and interest rate spread. PC: Principal Component. RL: Rule of Law. RQ: Regulation 
Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. PS: Political Stability. CC: Control of Corruption.  BoP: Balance of Payments. The 
definitions in Table 1 are from World Governance Indicators and World Development Indicators. The computation and 
presentation of the governance variables are such that higher values indicate better governance conditions. 
 
 
Governance (EG) is defined as the ability of government to formulate and implement policies that are 
conducive to the economic activity.  
Table 2: Principal component analysis (PCA) for KE indicators 
Knowledge Economy 
dimensions 
Component Matrix (Loadings) First 
PC 
Eigen 
Value 
Indexes 
     
Education  School 
Enrolment  
PSE SSE TSE    
0.438 0.657 0.614 0.658 1.975 Educatex 
           
Information & 
Infrastructure 
ICTs  Internet Mobile Telephone    
0.614 0.584 0.531 0.730 2.190 ICTex 
           
Innovation 
System  
Innovation STJA Trademarks Patents     
0.567 0.572 0.592 0.917 2.753 Innovex 
           
Economic 
Incentive 
Economic 
Incentive  
Private Credit  Interest rate Spread    
-0.707 0.707 0.656 1.313 Creditex 
           
PC: Principal Component. PSE: Primary School Enrolment. SSE: Secondary School Enrolment. TSE: Tertiary School Enrolment. PC: Principal 
Component. ICTs: Information and Communication Technologies. Educatex is the first principal component of primary, secondary and tertiary school 
enrolments. ICTex: first principal component of mobile, telephone and internet subscriptions. STJA: Scientific and Technical Journal Articles. Innovex: 
first principal component of STJA, trademarks and patents (resident plus nonresident). Creditex: first principal component of private domestic credit and 
interest rate spread.  
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Table 3: Principal component analysis (PCA) for governance (Gov) 
Principal 
Components 
Component Matrix(Loadings) Proportion Cumulative 
Proportion 
Eigen 
Value   
 RQ GE RL CC    
First PC (GG) 0.478 0.514 0.514 0.493 0.859 0.859 3.438 
Second  PC 0.786 -0.006 -0.149 -0.601 0.078 0.938 0.314 
Third PC 0.392 -0.567 -0.385 0.614 0.033 0.971 0.132 
        
First PC (EG) 0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.906 0.906 1.812 
Second PC -0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.093 1.000 0.187 
        
First PC (IG) --- --- 0.707 0.707 0.935 0.935 1.871 
Second PC --- --- -0.707 0.707 0.064 1.000 0.128 
        
PC: Principal Component. RL: Rule of Law. RQ: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. CC: Control of Corruption. GG (General 
Governance): First PC of RQ, GE, RL & CC. EG (Economic Governance): First PC of RQ & GE. IG (Institutional Governance): First PC of RL & CC.  
 
Institutional governance (IG) denotes the respect for citizens and the state of institutions that govern the 
interactions among them as well between the people and institutions, and the government (Andrés et al. 
2014). Table 3 above displays eigenvalues for GG, EG, and IG which are in excess of one. 
3.4 Peace and stability indicators, and control variables 
The indicators of peace and stability are not subjected to the PCA; they are used in the first-stage. Also 
not considered for the PCA are control variables which include: inflation, government expenditure, per 
capita economic prosperity, ICT service exports, liquid liabilities and financial system efficiency. 
Inflation is an annual percentage; financial efficiency are ratios of financial system credit 
(liabilities)/financial system bank deposits (assets); per capita economic prosperity is GDP growth rate 
adjusted for population growth; exports are percentages of ICT service exports as a ratio of total 
exports; and government expenditure and liquid liabilities are time-dynamics of current real GDP. 
The choice of control variables is consistent with Andrés et al. (2015). With the exception of inflation, 
we generally expect control variables to affect KE positively. However, because the KE dimensions 
have distinct characteristics, the expected signs are neither predictable nor known a priori. For instance, 
per capita economic growth may not have the same effect on education and innovation. As another 
example, the presence of surplus liquidity issues documented in the African financial literature 
(Saxegaard, 2006; Asongu, 2014b; Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017) could change the expected sign of 
financial efficiency and liquid liabilities on economic incentives (credit availability). 
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3.5 Theoretical Framework   
We claim that globalization induces peace and stability, which affects governance, and hence 
KE. The claim is theoretically sound and demonstrable as an augmented Solow (1957) 
aggregate production function in which KE(𝑌𝑖𝑡)across countries(i) at any time(t) depends on 
conventional factors and forces of production (𝑋𝑖𝑡) and the state of technology (𝐴𝑖𝑡), i.e., 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = (𝑋𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑖𝑡)
𝛼 exp(µ
𝑖𝑡
).  (1) 
 
Next we let the state of technology evolve as  𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴𝑖0 exp(𝑔𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝑍𝑖𝑡) such that (1) expands to 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝛼𝐴𝑖0 
𝛼 exp(𝛼𝑔𝑡 +  𝛼𝛽𝑖𝑍𝑖𝑡 +  µ𝑖𝑡).       (2) 
For 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∊ 𝑍𝑖𝑡, we can restate (2) as  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝛼𝐴𝑖0 
𝛼 exp(𝛼𝑔𝑡 +  𝛼𝛽1𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼𝛽2𝑍𝑖𝑡
∗ +  µ
𝑖𝑡
),    (3) 
where empirically 𝛼𝑔𝑡 =  𝜉𝑡is a time-fixed effect,Stability is a placeholder for ‘peace and 
stability’, and 𝑍𝑖𝑡
∗ = 1 − 𝑍𝑖𝑡 are sources of influence other than Stability.Dividing both sides 
of (3) by some Xjand taking the natural logarithms leads to the Xj -intensive form of (3) as: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖0 + 𝛼𝑔𝑡 +  𝛼𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝛽1𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝛽2𝑧𝑖𝑡
∗ + µ
𝑖𝑡
,    (4) 
where𝑦𝑖𝑡 = ln (
𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑋𝑗𝑡
) , 𝑎𝑖0 = 𝛼 ln(𝐴𝑖0),  𝑥𝑖𝑡 = ln (
𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑋𝑗𝑡
) , 𝑧𝑖𝑡
∗ =
𝑍𝑖𝑡
∗
𝑋𝑗𝑡
, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. 
Since our claim is that𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡), and 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡),then 
the hypotheses we put forward are simply restatements of (4) as 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝛼𝐴𝑖0 
𝛼 exp[(𝛼𝑔𝑡 +  𝛼𝛽1(𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡(𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡(𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡))))]𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝛽2𝑍𝑖𝑡
∗ +  µ𝑖𝑡). 
            (4’) 
We assume𝐴𝑖𝑂
𝛼 instead of (𝑋𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑖0)
𝛼for simplicity and to avoid discussion of whether or not 
𝐴𝑖𝑡is factor- biased and or (dis)embodied. Also note that the arithmetic sign of 𝛼𝛽𝑖 is 
ambiguous, i.e., 𝛼𝛽𝑖> 0 iff 𝛼 > 0   and 𝛽𝑖 > 0, or 𝛼 < 0  and 𝛽𝑖 < 0. Similarly, 𝛼𝛽𝑖< 0 
iff𝛼 > 0  and 𝛽𝑖 < 0 , or α < 0 and β > 0.  
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3.6 Testable hypotheses  
We use three main steps to substantiate the proposition that globalization induces peace and 
stability, which in turn affects governance, and hence KE.The formulation of, and the 
connection between, testable hypotheses are based on intuition, the relevant literature and 
stylized facts we have engaged.The first-stage addresses globalization-induced peace and 
stability. The instrumentation process produces three main outcomes: trade-induced stability 
(TradeStab), stability induced by financial openness (FDIStab), and stability induced by 
general globalization (GlobStab).
5
 
 In the second-stage, governance is instrumented with globalization-induced stability 
obtained from first-stage regressions. Nine outcomes emerge from this exercise: EG as a 
function of trade-induced stability; EG as determined by stability that is induced by financial 
openness; EG as a function of globalization-induced stability; IG driven by trade-induced 
stability; IG as affected by stability based on financial openness; IG as caused by 
globalization-induced stability; GG as a function of trade-induced stability; GG as influenced 
by stability resulting from financial openness,  and finally GG as a function of globalization-
induced stability. 
 The third-stage of the estimation process deals with the KE-governance relationship. 
In the end the entire estimation process reduces to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Stability from globalization is associated with governance which influences 
KE in terms of education.  
Hypothesis 2: Stability from globalization is associated with governance which influences 
KE in terms of ICT .  
Hypothesis 3: Stability from globalization is associated with governance which influences 
KE in terms of economic incentives.  
Hypothesis 4: Stability from globalization is associated with governance which influences 
KE in terms of innovation.  
With these four hypotheses the research problem is ultimately about the proposition that 
Globalization →Stability → Governance → KE. 
                                                          
5Two notes here: One, we use the term “induce” only to assert significant correlations between and 
among our key variables, not causation. Two, we have dropped de juré capital openness (KAOPEN) 
in preference for the de facto (Foreign direct investment) measurement because the former has a lower 
standard deviation. 
 
16 
 
3.7 Estimation technique  
We utilize an instrumental variable (IV) panel fixed effects estimation strategy. As far as we 
are aware, this is the first attempt at tackling the endogeneity problem via a three-stage 
process. The strategy is appropriate because it requires the instruments to be strong, but not 
necessarily valid. In other words, we are more concerned with the strength of the instruments 
than we are with their validity for two main reasons. While existing research such as White 
(1980a, 1980b), for example, has laid the theoretical ground upon which the intuitive 
underpinning of our estimation technique, compared to previous studies we use the fixed 
effect strategy to reduce the influence of omitted variable due to geographical, cultural, and 
other factors (Oxley and McAleer, 1993; Pesaran, 2006). In that limited sense this is the first 
paper to engage such empirics. Second, the problem we confront is not concerned with 
instrument validity. For instance, the first-stage does not require us to prove that globalization 
is valid in inducing peace and stability, but that it is strong in doing so. Hence, while the 
validity of globalization as an instrument for peace and stability may consolidate the intuition 
for the empirics, it is not a necessary condition to validate the transition to stage-two of the 
estimation process.  
 The following are the three-stages of the estimation strategy: 
3.7.1 First-stage regression:  
 ititit FDITradeStability )()( 210  t it ,     (5) 
where Stability represents ‘peace and stability’, Trade is for foreign trade openness, FDI is 
Foreign Direct Investment as represented by financial openness, and t  is a time-specific 
constant, accounting for time fixed effects. In this stage the estimation process saves the fitted 
values for use in the second-stage regression.
6
 
3.7.2 Second-stage regression:
 
ittitititit GlobStabFDIStabTradeStabGovernance   )()()( 3210 ,
 (6)
 
                                                          
6
IVTradeStab: Trade Openness influenced stability. IVFDIStab: Financial Openness influenced stability. 
IVGlobStab: Globalization influenced stability.  
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where Governance = Goventails GG, EG, and IG, and TradeStab, FDIStab, and 
GlobStabrefer to globalization related peace and stability. Again, governance indicators are 
regressed on the fitted values of Stability from the first-stage, thereby generating nine main 
variables described above.
7
 
 
3.7.3 Third-stage regression: 
ittitititit
ititit
itititit
XGGGlobStabGGFDIStabbGGTradeSta
IGGlobStabIGFDIStabbIGTradeSta
EGGlobStabEGFDIStabbEGTradeStaKE






10987
654
3210
)()()(
)()()(
)()()(
   (7) 
where on the left-hand side KE is represented by Educatex, ICTex, Innovex, and Creditex, and 
on the right-hand side are indicators of governance as influenced by globaziation-related 
peace and stability, and X is a vector of control variables. Note that it would seem that (7) 
does not include the conventional factors of production like labor, and human and physical 
capital. However, these are implied by the “economic growth” variable.
 
Also note that(a) the vector of error terms, µit, in (1)-(4) is now specified in (5)-(7) as it
, 𝜀𝑖𝑡,and it  respectively, and (b) in a Solow production function framework 𝜉𝑡 =  𝛼𝑔𝑡 is a 
Hicks neutral Solow constant (residual). In Solow originale 𝐴𝑖𝑡 = exp(𝑔𝑡),and its growth 
rate is𝑔. Here we are saying that KE is augmented by globalization-influenced peace and 
stability acting through governance such that 𝐴𝑖𝑡 = (𝐴𝑖0 exp(𝑔𝑡 +  𝛽𝑖𝑍𝑖𝑡))
𝛼.  In that case the 
rate of technical change is 𝛼(𝑔 + 𝜂𝑖), 𝜂𝑖 =
𝑑[𝛽𝑖𝑍𝑖𝑡]
𝑑𝑡
. 
A correlation analysis is employed to assess the degree of substitution of the ‘generated 
regressors’ from second-stage regressions to mitigate statistical problems that could bias the 
                                                          
7
IVEGTradeStab: Economic governance (EG) associated with Trade openness (Trade) influenced 
stability (Stab). IVEGFDIStab: Economic governance (EG) associated with financial openness (FDI) 
influenced stability (Stab). IVEGGlobStab: Economic governance (EG) associated 
withGlobalisation(Glob) influenced stability(Stab). IVIGTradeStab: Institutional governance (IG) 
associated with Trade openness (Trade) influenced stability (Stab).  IVIGFDIStab: Institutional 
governance (IG) associated with Financial openness (FDI) influenced stability (Stab). IVIGGlobStab: 
Institutional governance (IG) associated with Globalization (Glob) influenced stability (Stab). 
IVGGtTradeStab: General governance (GG) associated with Trade openness (Trade) influenced 
stability (Stab). IVGGFDIStab: General governance (GG) associated with Financial openness (FDI) 
influenced stability (Stab). IVGGGlobStab: General governance (GG) associated with Globalization 
(Glob) influenced stability (Stab). 
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signs of estimated coefficients and reduce their technical efficiency (cf. Pagan, 1984). From 
that analysis and previous literature, it is clear that in all three stages the regressions are 
consistent with Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard errors, 
non-homogenous variance of an unknown form, and time fixed effects. To address these 
issues,we deploy the principal component analysis, followed by the HAC technique. Judge, 
Griffiths, Hill, Lütkepohl, and Lee (1985, Chapter 11) survey specifications of the 
heteroskedastic variance. We assume the variance to be of an unknown functional form, 
which does not defeat our purpose since we are not trying to correct for endogeneity with 
instrumental variables per se. Thus, we see no classical regression imperative for instrument 
validity. We are using an IV approach to demonstrate relations among globalization, peace 
and stability, governance, and KE. We do not care too much about whether one variable is 
valid in instrumenting another. What we care about most is that, based on the literature and 
intuition, there are grounds for strong relations among variables. In that sense the applied IV 
econometrics approach need not be restricted to the validity of the instruments. 
4. Results and discussion 
In this section we present the estimation results by stage, and then discuss their implications 
for policy and further research before we conclude. 
 
4.1 Results 
4.1.1First- and second-stage instrumentations  
Table 4reports the instrumentation of the first- and second-stage regressions. Panel A 
indicates positive effects of trade on peace and stability, while those of FDI switch signs. In 
Panel B trade-influenced peace and stability affects governance more strongly than FDI-
related peace and stability. Again, while the procedure for testing the strength of instruments 
could be limited to the information criterion in Panel A as documented in Beck, Demirguc-
Kunt and Levine (2003), and Andrés and Asongu (2013), we have gone a step further to 
provide evidence on the strength of instruments in Panel B. The instrumentation process is 
not based on Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), because the instruments are neither strong nor 
valid using the OLS estimator. Therefore, we use the HAC procedure to generate results with 
appealing information criteria based on the strength of the instruments.  
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4.1.2 Third-stage instrumentation 
Before engaging the third-stage regressions to analyze the main hypotheses, we examined 
multicollinearity and overparameterization issues in the fitted values from second-stage 
regressions. Summary statistics for the instrumented variables revealed a substantial degree 
of substitution among the fitted values obtained from the second-stage instrumentation 
process. Hence, the third-stage specifications employ the instrumented values independently 
across specifications. 
4.1.3 Third-state regressions: Investigating the four hypotheses 
The results for the KE Hypothesis 1 that peace and stability resulting from globalization is 
related to governance which influences KE in terms of education are reported in Table 5. The 
hypothesis is accepted across specifications. The positive signs are consistent with both 
intuition and the predictions of economic theory. In increasing order of relevance and 
significance the effects of trade-influenced stability on institutional governance are weakest 
whereas those of trade-influenced stability are the strongest, with other cases falling between 
the two extremes. 
KE Hypothesis 2 holds that peace and stability from globalization is related to 
governance, which influences KE in terms of ICT. In this case the estimates that are 
significant have the expected signs, and are consistent with both commonsense and 
theoretical predictions. For example, the effects on IG of the peace and stability resulting 
from financial openness are strongest and positive, but they are lowest with respect to EG. 
The impact on GG from the stability influenced by financial openness falls in-between (Table 
6). 
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Table 4: First and second-stage regressions (Instrumentation with panel HAC fixed effects) 
              
 Panel A: Instrumentation 
 
 
 First-stage regressions Second-stage regressions  
 Dependent variable:  Dependent variable: institutional and economic governance   
 Globalization-influenced Governance affected by Globalization-influenced conflicts  
 Political Stability/No violence Economic Governance Institutional Governance General Governance  
Constant -0.574*** -0.416*** -0.532** 0.542 1.495 -0.144 3.297 0.714 0.151 2.635 1.574 0.048 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.855) (0.271) (0.813) (0.372) (0.736) (0.840) (0.554) (0.433) (0.954) 
Trade  0.0004 ---- 0.001 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0,822)  (0.537)          
FDI --- 0.001 -0.001 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
  (0.840) (0.789)          
             
IVTradeStab --- --- --- 0.872 --- --- 5.909 --- --- 4.819 --- --- 
    (0.878)   (0.384)   (0.575)   
IVFDIStab --- --- --- --- 2.929 --- --- 0.956 --- --- 2.774 --- 
     (0.413)   (0.850)   (0.600)  
IVGlobStab --- --- --- --- --- -1.520 --- --- -0.476 --- --- -1.410 
      (0.346)   (0.791)   (0.528) 
             
Adjusted R² 0.809 0.807 0.812 0.894 0.910 0.909 0.899 0.915 0.914 0.910 0.928 0.927 
Fisher  48.292*** 41.82*** 40.28*** 92.74*** 97.45*** 90.95*** 98.29*** 104.0*** 97.43*** 111.5*** 124.6*** 115.6*** 
Obs 567 440 419 542 418 397 554 430 409 542 418 397 
Countries 51 45 45 50 44 44 51 45 45 50 45 44 
             
             
 Panel B: Testing the Strength of the instruments  
             
Constant 0.0000 0.0000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
Instrument  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (0.822) (0.840) (0.534) (0.878) (0.413) (0.346) (0.384) (0.850) (0.791) (0.575) (0.600) (0.528) 
             
Ajusted R² 0.809 0.807 0.812 0.894 0.910 0.909 0.899 0.915 0.914 0.910 0.928 0.927 
Fisher  48.292*** 41.82*** 41.28*** 92.74*** 97.45*** 90.95*** 98.29*** 104.0*** 97.43*** 111.5*** 124.6*** 115.6*** 
Obs 567 440 419 542 418 397 554 430 409 542 418 397 
Countries 51 45 45 50 44 44 51 45 45 50 45 44 
             
IVTradeStab: Trade Openness influenced stability. IVFDIStab: Financial Openness influenced stability; IVGlobStab: Globalization influenced 
Stability. *, **, ***: significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. HAC: Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent 
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Table 5:  Effects on Education (Educatex) with panel HAC panel fixed effects 
           
 Dependent variable: Educatex (Third-Stage Regressions) 
          
Constant -21.05* -7.889** -1.449 -2.615 -23.56** 2.374 -4.962* -11.63** 3.302 
 (0.072) (0.030) (0.000) (0.104) (0.026) (0.272) (0.087) (0.028) (0.298) 
IVEGTradeStab 26.66* --- ---- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.068) 8.400**        
IVEGFDIStab --- (0.024) ---- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
          
IVEGGloStab --- --- 0.737 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
   (0.406)       
IVIGTradeStab --- --- --- 3.937* --- --- --- --- --- 
    (0.068)      
IVIGFDIStab --- --- --- --- 25.71** --- --- --- --- 
     (0.024)     
IVIGGlobStab --- --- --- --- --- -1.956 --- --- --- 
      (0.361)    
IVGGTradeStab --- --- --- --- --- --- 4.828* --- --- 
       (0.068)   
IVGGFDIStab --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 8.870** --- 
        (0.024)  
IVGGGlobStab --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -2.109 
         (0.361) 
Inflation 0.005 0.004 0.005** 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 
 (0.671) (0.357) (0.013) (0.671) (0.357) (0.465) (0.671) (0.357) (0.465) 
Gov. Expenditure  0.006** 0.003 -0.002 0.006** 0.003 0.002 0.006** 0.003 0.002 
 (0.028) (0.303) (0.152) (0.028) (0.303) (0.413) (0.028) (0.303) (0.413) 
GDP pcg -0.009 -0.008 0.005 -0.009 -0.008 0.001 -0.009 -0.008 0.001 
 (0.232) (0.481) (0.506) (0.232) (0.481) (0.888) (0.232) (0.481) (0.888) 
          
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R² 0.936 0.946 0.985 0.936 0.946 0.944 0.936 0.946 0.944 
Fisher  58.21*** 63.71*** 200.57*** 58.21*** 63.71*** 60.87*** 58.21*** 63.71*** 60.87*** 
Countries  31 28 28 31 28 28 31 28 28 
Observations  149 125 125 149 125 125 149 125 125 
          
IVEGTradeStab: Economic governance (EG) associated with Trade openness (Trade) influenced stability (Stab). IVEGFDIStab: Economic governance (EG) associated with financial openness (FDI) influenced 
stability (Stab). IVEGGlobStab: Economic governance (EG) associated with Globalisation(Glob) influenced stability(Stab). IVIGTradeStab: Institutional governance (IG) associated with Trade openness (Trade) 
influenced stability (Stab).  IVIGFDIStab: Institutional governance (IG) associated with Financial openness (FDI) influenced stability (Stab). IVIGGlobStab: Institutional governance (IG) associated with Globalization 
(Glob) influenced stability (Stab). IVGGtTradeStab: General governance (GG) associated with Trade openness (Trade) influenced stability (Stab). IVGGFDIStab: General governance (GG) associated with Financial 
openness (FDI) influenced stability (Stab). IVGGGlobStab: General governance (GG) associated with Globalization (Glob) influenced stability (Stab). Gov. Government. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth. *, **, ***: 
significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. HAC: Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent.  It is important to note that the high coefficient of determination (or R²) may reflect the explanatory power 
of the control variables used, instead of the explanatory power of the independent variable of interest. 
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 Table 7 represents KE Hypothesis 3 which states that stability from globalization is 
related to governance, which influences KE in terms of economic incentives. The significant 
estimates have mixed signs, with the negative effects for FDI related estimates and positive 
for trade related globalization estimates. Specifically, the positive values related to 
globalization influenced stability are highest in regard to IG and lowest with respect to EG, 
with GG lying between. In absolute terms, the effects of FDI-related estimates are highest in 
IG and lowest in EG, and GG from FDI-influenced stability is in the middle. The negative 
effect of FDI could be explained by the fact that FDI itself is weakly associated with the 
issues of surplus liquidity in African financial institutions. Trade is a mutually beneficial 
exchange of comparative advantages; FDI flows easily when the risk-free rate of return is 
higher in the destination, than it is in the originating, country. Alternatively, while trading 
activities are most likely to involve borrowing from domestic banks mainly, FDI activities 
involve foreign banks as the main financial players. In such cases FDI would have a limited 
positive impact on peace and stability, and could have a negative effect if it is driven by 
politics. Put differently, while trade tends to integrate, FDI politics tend to disintegrate 
(Alesina, Spolaore, Wacziarg, 2000, cf. Rodrik and Subramanian, 2009).  
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Table 6: Effects on ICT (ICTex) with panel HAC panel fixed effects 
          
 Dependent variable: ICTex (Third-Stage Regressions) 
          
Constant -40.98 -24.28*** 7.313 -4.573 -61.02*** 18.318 -9.203 -32.98*** 9.940 
 (0.202) (0.007) (0.103) (0.241) (0.006) (0.117) (0.219) (0.006) (0.109) 
IVEGTradeStab 46.329 --- ---- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.198)         
IVEGFDIStab --- 25.68*** ---- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
  (0.006)        
IVEGGloStab --- --- -7.174 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
   (0.127)       
IVIGTradeStab --- --- --- 6.842 --- --- --- --- --- 
    (0.198)      
IVIGFDIStab --- --- --- --- 78.64*** --- --- --- --- 
     (0.000)     
IVIGGloStab --- --- --- --- --- -22.89 --- --- --- 
      (0.127)    
IVGGTradeStab --- --- --- --- --- --- 8.390 --- --- 
       (0.198)   
IGGFDIStab --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 27.12*** --- 
        (0.000)  
IVGGGloStab --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -7.732 
         (0.127) 
Inflation 0.011 0.022 0.025 0.011 0.022 0.025 0.011 0.022 0.025 
 (0.465) (0.113) (0.116) (0.465) (0.113) (0.116) (0.465) (0.113) (0.116) 
Gov. Expenditure  0.002 0.006** 0.010** 0.002 0.006** 0.010** 0.002 0.006** 0.010** 
 (0.636) (0.044) (0.039) (0.636) (0.044) (0.039) (0.636) (0.044) (0.039) 
GDP pcg -0.051*** -0.077*** -0.058*** -0.051*** -0.077*** -0.058*** -0.051*** -0.077*** -0.058*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ICTservicesexport 0.102*** 0.100** 0.085** 0.102*** 0.100** 0.085** 0.102*** 0.100** 0.085** 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.025) (0.000) (0.010) (0.025) (0.006) (0.010) (0.025) 
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R² 0.777 0.817 0.809 0.777 0.817 0.809 0.777 0.817 0.809 
Fisher  20.95*** 25.21*** 23.94*** 20.95*** 25.21*** 23.94*** 20.95*** 25.21*** 23.94*** 
Countries  28 27 27 28 27 27 28 27 27 
Observations  201 185 185 201 185 185 201 185 185 
          
IVEGTradeStab: Economic governance (EG) associated with Trade openness (Trade) influenced stability (Stab). IVEGFDIStab: Economic 
governance (EG) associated with financial openness (FDI) influenced stability (Stab). IVEGGlobStab: Economic governance (EG) 
associated with Globalisation(Glob) influenced stability(Stab). IVIGTradeStab: Institutional governance (IG) associated with Trade 
openness (Trade) influenced stability (Stab).  IVIGFDIStab: Institutional governance (IG) associated with Financial openness (FDI) 
influenced stability (Stab). IVIGGlobStab: Institutional governance (IG) associated with Globalization (Glob) influenced stability (Stab). 
IVGGtTradeStab: General governance (GG) associated with Trade openness (Trade) influenced stability (Stab). IVGGFDIStab: General 
governance (GG) associated with Financial openness (FDI) influenced stability (Stab). IVGGGlobStab: General governance (GG) 
associated with Globalization (Glob) influenced stability (Stab). *,**,***: significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. HAC: 
Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent. It is important to note that the high coefficient of determination (or R²) may reflect the 
explanatory power of the control variables used, instead of the explanatory power of the independent variable of interest. 
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Table 7: Effects on Economic incentives (Creditex) with panel HAC panel fixed effects 
          
 Dependent variable: Creditex (Third-Stage Regressions) 
          
Constant 3.894* 3.030*** 0.483 1.505*** 6.308*** -0.939 1.809*** 3.813*** 0.142 
 (0.092) (0.000) (0.298) (0.001) (0.000) (0.439) (0.007) (0.000) (0.819) 
IVEGTradeStab -3.562 --- ---- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.218)         
IVEGFDIStab --- -1.802** ---- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
  (0.017)        
IVEGGloStab --- --- 0.731* --- --- --- --- --- --- 
   (0.089)       
IVIGTradeStab --- --- --- -0.526 --- --- --- --- --- 
    (0.218)      
IVIGFDIStab --- --- --- --- -5.517** --- --- --- --- 
     (0.017)     
IVIGGloStab --- --- --- --- --- 2.334* --- --- --- 
      (0.089)    
IVGGTradeStab --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.645 --- --- 
       (0.218)   
IVGGFDIStab --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -1.903** --- 
        (0.017)  
IVGGGloStab --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.788* 
         (0.089) 
Inflation -0.0009 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0004 -0.0005 
 (0.591) (0.831) (0.847) (0.591) (0.831) (0.847) (0.591) (0.831) (0.847) 
Gov. Expenditure  0.001 0.0001 0.0001 0.001 0.0001 0.0001 0.001 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.174) (0.902) (0.870) (0.174) (0.902) (0.870) (0.174) (0.902) (0.870) 
GDPpcg 0.0008 0.002 0.001 0.0008 0.002 0.001 0.0008 0.002 0.001 
 (0.662) (0.457) (0.705) (0.662) (0.457) (0.705) (0.662) (0.457) (0.705) 
Liquid liabilities  -1.731*** -1.944*** -1.956*** -1.731*** -1.944*** -1.956*** -1.731*** -1.944*** -1.956*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Financial efficiency  -1.158*** -1.236*** -1.267*** -1.158*** -1.236*** -1.267*** -1.158*** -1.236*** -1.267*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
          
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R² 0.975 0.980 0.980 0.975 0.980 0.980 0.975 0.980 0.980 
Fisher  261.09*** 306.20*** 304.37*** 261.09*** 306.20*** 304.37*** 261.09*** 306.20*** 304.37*** 
Countries  24 20 20 24 20 20 24 20 20 
Observations  211 172 172 211 172 172 211 172 172 
          
IVEGTradeStab: Economic governance (EG) associated with Trade openness (Trade) influenced stability (Stab). IVEGFDIStab: Economic 
governance (EG) associated with financial openness (FDI) influenced stability (Stab). IVEGGlobStab: Economic governance (EG) 
associated with Globalisation(Glob) influenced stability(Stab). IVIGTradeStab: Institutional governance (IG) associated with Trade 
openness (Trade) influenced stability (Stab).  IVIGFDIStab: Institutional governance (IG) associated with Financial openness (FDI) 
influenced stability (Stab). IVIGGlobStab: Institutional governance (IG) associated with Globalization (Glob) influenced stability (Stab). 
IVGGtTradeStab: General governance (GG) associated with Trade openness (Trade) influenced stability (Stab). IVGGFDIStab: General 
governance (GG) associated with Financial openness (FDI) influenced stability (Stab). IVGGGlobStab: General governance (GG) 
associated with Globalization (Glob) influenced stability (Stab). *,**,***: significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. HAC: 
Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent. It is important to note that the high coefficient of determination (or R²) may reflect the 
explanatory power of the control variables used, instead of the explanatory power of the independent variable of interest. 
 
 Finally, the KE Hypothesis 4 states that peace and stability from globalization is 
related to governance, which influences KE in terms of innovation. Table 8 indicates that the 
effects range from the low of -14.26 to the high of 23.95.The positive impacts for EG are 
highest at 23.95, followed by GG at 4.33, and last by IG at 3.53. Regarding the negative 
effects, globalization-influenced peace and stability has the largest negative effect (-14.26) on 
IG, -4.47 on EG, and -4.82 on GG. The logical inference is that trade openness is a more 
effective mechanism for the innovation aspect of KE than FDI in these countries.
8
 
                                                          
8
The results in Tables 5-8 stress the strength of the relationships, and not so much the statistical significance of 
individual coefficients, although those are important, too.  
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 Most of the key control variables have the expected signs. For example, government 
expenditure improves education. ICT services and government expenditure have a positive 
impact on ICT. Third, the negative relationship between the financial indicators and 
economic incentives confirm the predictions of economic theory as documented by the 
literature on the surplus liquidity issues in African financial institutions (cf. Saxegaard, 2006; 
Asongu et al., 2016b).  
Table 8:  Effects on Innovation (Innovex) with panel HAC panel fixed effects 
          
 Dependent variable: Innovex (Third-Stage Regressions) 
          
Constant -17.197* -2.687 4.258** -1.785 -5.721 9.251* -3.745* -3.400 5.449* 
 (0.071) (0.773) (0.048) (0.101) (0.782) (0.062) (0.075) (0.777) (0.053) 
IVEGTradeStab 23.948* --- ---- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.072)         
IVEGFDIStab --- 2.934 ---- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
  (0.790)        
IVEGGloStab --- --- -4.471* --- --- --- --- --- --- 
   (0.078)       
IVIGTradeStab --- --- --- 3.536* --- --- --- --- --- 
    (0.072)      
IVIGFDIStab --- --- --- --- 8.980 --- --- --- --- 
     (0.790)     
IVIGGloStab --- --- --- --- --- -14.26* --- --- --- 
      (0.078)    
IVGGTradeStab --- --- --- --- --- --- 4.336* --- --- 
       (0.072)   
IVGGFDIStab --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 3.098 --- 
        (0.790)  
IVGGGloStab --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -4.819* 
         (0.078) 
Inflation 0.006 0.015** 0.010 0.006 0.015** 0.010 0.006 0.015** 0.010 
 (0.288) (0.029) (0.239) (0.288) (0.029) (0.239) (0.288) (0.029) (0.239) 
Gov. Expenditure  0.001 0.006* 0.004* 0.001 0.006* 0.004* 0.001 0.006* 0.004* 
 (0.153) (0.055) (0.066) (0.153) (0.055) (0.066) (0.153) (0.055) (0.066) 
GDP pcg 0.003 0.016 0.008 0.003 0.016 0.008 0.003 0.016 0.008 
 (0.698) (0.321) (0.425) (0.698) (0.321) (0.425) (0.698) (0.321) (0.425) 
Liquid Liabilities 2.411* 2.943 2.548* 2.411* 2.943 2.548* 2.411* 2.943 2.548* 
 (0.080) (0.130) (0.086) (0.080) (0.130) (0.086) (0.080) (0.130) (0.086) 
          
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R² 0.976 0.974 0.974 0.976 0.974 0.974 0.976 0.974 0.974 
Fisher  164.98*** 134.93*** 139.05*** 164.98*** 134.93*** 139.05*** 164.98*** 134.93*** 139.05*** 
Countries  13 11 11 13 11 11 13 11 11 
Observations  81 65 65 81 65 65 81 65 65 
          
IVEGTradeStab: Economic governance (EG) associated with Trade openness (Trade) influenced stability (Stab). IVEGFDIStab: Economic 
governance (EG) associated with financial openness (FDI) influenced stability (Stab). IVEGGlobStab: Economic governance (EG) 
associated with Globalisation(Glob) influenced stability(Stab). IVIGTradeStab: Institutional governance (IG) associated with Trade 
openness (Trade) influenced stability (Stab).  IVIGFDIStab: Institutional governance (IG) associated with Financial openness (FDI) 
influenced stability (Stab). IVIGGlobStab: Institutional governance (IG) associated with Globalization (Glob) influenced stability (Stab). 
IVGGtTradeStab: General governance (GG) associated with Trade openness (Trade) influenced stability (Stab). IVGGFDIStab: General 
governance (GG) associated with Financial openness (FDI) influenced stability (Stab). IVGGGlobStab: General governance (GG) 
associated with Globalization (Glob) influenced stability (Stab). *,**,***: significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. HAC: 
Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent. It is important to note that the high coefficient of determination (or R²) may reflect the 
explanatory power of the control variables used, instead of the explanatory power of the independent variable of interest. 
 
4.2 Discussion 
We find that globalization-induced peace and stability can have positive and negative 
influences on governance and KE in African countries at the same time, depending on how 
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both globalization and governance are defined. The relations are of varying strengths. 
Overall, one may interpret such findings as meaning that the ambitions for KE in these 
countries are realistic and achievable as long as the countries continue to engage in the kinds 
of globalization that influence, peace and stability, and do so in ways that promote good 
governance. The results are encouraging because the positive impacts outweigh the negative 
ones, and they clarify why globalization may actually be positively associated with peace and 
stability, while at the same time increasing poverty and inequality. Such an interpretation 
would be consistent with Kremer and Maskin’s (2007) skepticism about the net benefit of 
globalization for low-income countries and people.
9
 
 The use of extra instrumental variables of globalization and peace and stability in this 
study confirms that governance is a necessary, but insufficient condition, for KE. However, 
the results add that governance depends on peace and stability, which is driven by 
globalization. A major policy implication of that addition is that for African KEs to benefit 
from globalization, they must improve the kind of peace and political stability needed to 
initiate the positive role of governance in KE. The implication raises some concern, because 
African countries have had low levels of political stability (Asongu, 2014c). The situation is 
particularly concerning for the African countries with long histories instability.
10
 
Where institutions for governance are deficient instability puts additional pressure on 
systems already strained. But to reverse the trend of the continent’s low and falling overall 
index of KE, it is essential for policy to focus on improving conditions for peace and stability 
and governance (Anyanwu, 2012). The positive weight of trade openness on economic 
incentives and the negative effects of FDI estimates on economic incentives present starting 
points for new KE policies. The negative effect on governance of FDI-induced peace and 
stability means that FDI activities mainly involve foreign operators and financial institutions, 
often in cahoots with corrupt local political elites, which is consistent with literature on 
                                                          
9
Maskin and Kremer (2007) have done a lot of work questioning whether globalization decreases or increases 
inequality and poverty, and how, using modified versions of Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage. 
10Conflicts that have impeded progress in the region include inter alia, a series of aborted coup d’états between 
1996-2003, the 2004-2007 Bush war, and the 2012 to present ‘Séléka/Anti-balaka’ conflicts in the CAR; the 
2007/2008 post-election crises in Kenya, politico-economic strife in Zimbabwe and increasing determination of 
Boko Haram to destabilize Nigeria; Burundi (1993-2005); Sierra Leone (1991-2002); Angola (1975-2002); 
Chad (2005-2010); Liberia (1999-2003); the Darfur crisis of Sudan; waves of conflicts in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo; Côte d’Ivoire with a 2002-2007 civil war followed political crisis in 2011 and; Somalia 
where the Al-Shabab militant group has just been defeated after over 20 decades of civil war.  
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liquidity of African financial institutions. Trade activities generally involve domestic 
financial institutions and economic operators. It follows that FDI entails less domestic 
financial intermediation than trade openness. Two, trade openness is a more inclusive and 
less restrictive mechanism for innovation than FDI. This implication is not without precedent; 
in terms of resource intensity Al-Sadig (2013) examined a panel of 91 developing countries 
over 1970-2000 time period and found that the effects of FDI on private investment were 
positive. However, he also observed that high human capital low-income countries benefit 
more from FDI than others (cf. Choong, 2012). 
Lastly, the results suggest a number of interesting future research directions, among 
them the following four. First, it would be interesting to use alternative measurements of 
globalization and peace and stability to test the current hypotheses. The tests in this paper 
assumed away causation, which implies that a second line for research would be to explore 
deeper the linkages running from KE to globalization instead of the other way around, 
including a reverse exposition of globalization-influenced conflicts or conflict- influenced 
globalization as starting points. To account for endogeneity bias, a third direction for research 
is to estimate the model as a system of seeming unrelated simultaneous equations. Finally, a 
fourth promising vein ready for mining is to integrate the current research into the 
opportunities opened up by the work of Hsiang, Meng, and Cane (2011), and Hsiang, Burke, 
and Miguel (2013) on climate-induced conflicts and to extend the analysis to as many 
developing countries as data availability would allow. 
In summary, we assessed the interconnections between and among the determinants of 
KE in African countries. First we linked globalization to peace and political stability. Second, 
we examined how peace and stability relate to governance. Finally we estimated the effects 
of governance on KE. We found that even though some were statistically insignificant, all the 
coefficients at all stages were economically relevant. This is a significant result. One broad 
implication of the findings, for example, is that while it is understandable why African 
countries are skeptical about the globalization, it turns out globalization offers important 
benefits to KE, by promoting social change through peace and stability, and that change 
facilitates good governance, and good governance is ‘good’ for KE. This implication advises 
African countries to remain and continue to strengthen their integration into the world 
economy. 
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5. Conclusions 
Previous research has led to the conclusion that formal institutions are necessary, but 
inadequate, determinants of KE. One key limitation of such research is that it did not consider 
the effects on KE of globalization either directly or indirectly through governance. We claim 
that globalization affects peace and stability, and the latter influences governance, which then 
may affect KE. We model the claim as a three-stage process in four hypotheses, and estimate 
each hypothesis using an instrumental variables technique that does not sacrifice economic 
relevance for statistical significance. The empirical evidence shows that globalization has 
varying relations with peace and stability, and that the latter influences governance 
differently depending on the kind of globalization involved.  
 Since the effects on governance of peace and stability influenced by globalization 
defined as trade are stronger than those resulting from peace and stability associated with 
globalization taken to be FDI, we further conclude that FDI is may not be a powerful 
mechanism for stimulating and sustaining KE in this group of countries. Moreover, 
globalization-influenced peace and stability have both positive and negative relations with 
governance simultaneously, which convinces us that the prospect for KE in African countries 
may be obtainable as long as these countries continue to engage in the kind of globalization 
that influences peace and stability. Improving peace and stability independent of 
globalization is another way to KE, but it is currently a difficult task given weak, or the 
absence of, institutions and ongoing conflicts. Even so, in situations where prevailing 
conflicts are due to unequal distribution of either resources (wealth) or the returns from 
resources (income), we conclude that there is a need for a sharp focus on economic and 
institutional governance more so than there is on general governance. Moreover, given the 
limits of the methodological approach that establishes relationships and not causality, these 
conclusions are exploratory and call for further confirmation using statistical techniques like 
Structural Equation Modeling.  
 Another caveat of this study is that the adopted KE path (globalization> 
peace/stability > governance > KE) ceteris paribus, is not unique because there are other 
future paths to knowledge and innovation in Africa (see Elani et al., 2013). Furthermore, the 
established conclusions may not hold if globalization keeps going on reverse. It is also 
important to note that in this study we have stressed that governance could be seen as having 
a “western bias” whereas the Chinese approach would rather focus in FDI and trade without 
caring about governance. Given China's massive presence in Africa, this assumption could be 
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clarified in a future study that is focused on China’s-driven globalization as a starting point of 
investigated hypotheses.   
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